What is a trusted setup ceremony?
A trusted setup ceremony creates the public parameters that some zero-knowledge proof systems need. Each participant adds secret randomness and destroys it, and the result is safe as long as at least one participant was honest.
Also called setup ceremony, Powers of Tau or structured reference string.
Explain it like I’m five
A group passes a bucket of gray paint around a circle. Each person adds one secret drop of color out of sight and passes it on. The final paint is public and everyone can use it, but nobody can un-mix it to find the drops. To work out the exact recipe, you would need every single person’s drop. If even one person forgets theirs on purpose, the recipe is lost for good.
What problem it solves
Some proof systems check a claim at a secret random point, which is far cheaper than checking it everywhere. The prover needs that point in a locked form, and someone has to choose it. Whoever knows the secret behind the point can forge proofs of false statements, such as a claim to own money that does not exist. A ceremony avoids relying on one person by letting many people each add a secret of their own and destroy it.
How it works, step by step
- The ceremony starts from public elliptic-curve points G, G times s, G times s squared, and so on, where s is a secret that nobody should know (the powers of tau).
- These points are useful because a polynomial can be committed to by combining them with its coefficients, so one curve point commits to data of any size. The hidden link between neighboring points lets a verifier check evaluations in constant time instead of touching every point (a KZG commitment).
- The first participant picks a fresh random secret t and transforms every point so that it hides s times t in place of s. The participant then deletes t.
- The next participant does the same on top of the last result. After many contributions the points hide the product of every participant’s secret.
- Each participant publishes a short proof of what they added, and anyone can check the whole chain with pairings, including that all the powers belong to the same secret, using random combinations of the points to keep the check cheap.
- The final points are the public parameters (the structured reference string). Some systems need separate parameters for each circuit, as Zcash’s spend and output circuits do.
- Only someone who knew every secret could recover the final one, so one participant who destroys theirs keeps everyone safe (the 1-of-N trust model).
A worked example
With three participants whose secrets are 2, 3 and 5, the final secret is 30. Someone who learns two of the three still cannot compute it, and real secrets are numbers of about 256 bits.
Ethereum’s KZG ceremony, which created the parameters that EIP-4844 relies on, took 141,416 contributions between 13 January and 8 August 2023. Contributors needed an Ethereum address with some history or a GitHub account, waited in a lobby and were drawn in random order, and the ceremony rejected incorrect contributions. The count includes linked addresses and is not the number of people.
What it guarantees
- Security needs only one honest participant, who might be you.
- Public transcripts let anyone verify that each contribution built on the one before.
- The ceremony is a one-time event, and the parameters are public and reusable. The best setups are universal, which means that one output supports many protocols.
- Good ceremonies are easy to join, for example in a browser, run on independently built software and need one round per participant, which lets thousands take part.
- The one failure case is that every participant kept their secret or lost control of it, and then forged proofs would look like valid ones.
Common misunderstandings
- Trusted does not mean that everyone must trust one person. A 1-of-N ceremony asks only that one participant, possibly you, was honest.
- No single place stores the secret. Each participant’s part exists only on their own machine until it is deleted, so the danger lies in all participants colluding or in a bug shared by every implementation.
- Not every proof system needs a ceremony. STARKs have none, and Halo 2 in Zcash’s Orchard pool needs no parameter files.
Where it is used
Zcash obtained its Sapling parameters from a multi-party computation. Ethereum’s EIP-4844 relies on KZG parameters from the 2023 ceremony.
History
Zcash’s first ceremony, in 2016, needed many rounds of communication and so had only six participants. Powers-of-tau designs need one round per participant. Aztec’s setup reached 176 participants, which Vitalik Buterin cites as better than six, and Ethereum’s 2023 ceremony reached 141,416 contributions.
In Redacted
Redacted needs no trusted setup at all. Its proofs are STARKs whose only cryptographic building block is a hash, so there are no secret parameters to create or destroy.
Bunker mode →Related terms
Sources: How do trusted setups work?, Vitalik Buterin, 2022 · KZG wrap, Ethereum Foundation Blog, 2024 · Announcing the KZG Ceremony, Ethereum Foundation Blog · Zcash Protocol Specification
Updated November 1, 2026. All terms